Download Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union by Jonathan Slapin PDF

By Jonathan Slapin

''This is an excellent booklet. The questions that Slapin asks approximately intergovernmental meetings (IGCs) within the eu Union are terribly vital and impressive, with implications for the ecu and for foreign cooperation extra mostly. moreover, Slapin's theorizing of his center questions is rigorous, lucid, and obtainable to scholarly readers with no wide formal modeling history . . . This publication is a high-quality, severe contribution to the literature on european studies.''
---Mark Pollack, Temple University

''An very good instance of the turning out to be literature that brings glossy political technological know-how to undergo at the politics of the eu Union.''
---Michael Laver, big apple University

Veto rights could be a significant resource of strength simply whilst leaving a company is very not likely. for instance, small eu states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the personal tastes in their better, extra economically and militarily strong associates whilst negotiating ecu Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all ecu members.

Jonathan B. Slapin lines the historic improvement of the veto privilege within the european and the way a veto---or veto threat---has been hired in treaty negotiations of the prior 20 years. As he explains, the significance of veto strength in treaty negotiations is without doubt one of the gains that distinguishes the ecu from different foreign agencies within which go out and expulsion threats play a better position. while, the prominence of veto energy signifies that bargaining within the ecu appears extra like bargaining in a federal method. Slapin's findings have major ramifications for the examine of foreign negotiations, the layout of overseas organisations, and eu integration.

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Extra resources for Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union

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The treaty was meant to continue reforms postponed during the 1992 Maastricht IGC, which had led to the Treaty on European Union, and was supposed to prepare EU institutions for the impending eastern enlargement. Many felt that prior to enlargement the EU needed to undertake substantial institutional reforms or face institutional breakdown. In particular, many agreed that the system of weighted voting in the Council of Ministers needed to be changed both to make legislative decision-making more efficient and to produce a more fair and democratic representation of the EU population.

These new data are among the best available on the preferences of member states and supranational actors at IGCs, and perhaps international negotiations more generally, but they are not perfect. Specifically, there is a problem of missing data. Of the 3876 possible preferences (17 actors times 228 issues), 1065 are missing (approximately 27%). Moreover, the vast majority of the recorded preferences support changing the status quo. Of the 2811 reported preferences, 1995 support altering the status quo while only 816 prefer the status quo.

Hug and K¨ onig (2002) and K¨onig and Slapin (2004) measure party positions using Eurobarometer data collected at the time of the IGC by assuming that party positions reflect the positions of their constituencies. Given the large literature on the EU’s democratic deficit, this assumption may also be questionable. 69). To construct my dependent variable, government bargaining positions, I use my member state preference data. Having found that a missing preference is very similar to a preference for the status quo in the Poisson model, I replace all missing preferences with preferences for the status quo.

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