By Gordon C. Rausser
This publication analyzes the hyperlinks among political economics, governance constructions, and the distribution of political energy in fiscal coverage making. The e-book theoretically explains and empirically quantifies those interactions. The research contains either public stable regulations and redistributive rules. half 1 of the booklet provides the conceptual foundations of political-economic bargaining and curiosity workforce research. After providing the underlying idea, half 2 of the publication examines ideology, prescription, and political energy coefficients; half three analyzes a few particular constructions; and half four provides a framework for political econometrics with a few empirical purposes and testable hypotheses. In all 4 components of the e-book, 4 analytical dimensions of public coverage are distinct: governance constructions, political economic climate, mechanism layout, and prevalence. [C:\Users\Microsoft\Documents\Calibre Library]
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Additional resources for Political Power and Economic Policy: Theory, Analysis, and Empirical Applications
In a prescriptive sense, a robust political and economic mix of policies can manage special interests whose inﬂuence might otherwise obstruct the public interest. In Chapter 14, moving from trade protection to liberalization is shown to harm some groups, which can block moves from the status quo if they are sufﬁciently powerful. 12 on Tue Oct 09 08:36:18 BST 2012. 002 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 26 Public Policy understanding of pareto-fulﬁlling compensation forms the basis for assessing the likelihood of reform taking place.
Hence, political-economic equilibrium-oriented government intervention is usually redistributive and is affected by politically powerful groups seeking transfers. 12 on Tue Oct 09 08:36:18 BST 2012. 4 Structure and Major Themes of the Book 25 market intervention are captured by examining tradeoffs among economic surpluses, political-economic transaction costs, and rent-seeking costs. The roles of the economic forces and political power structures in determining chosen policy regimes and values of policy instruments are analyzed.
In Chapter 2, the Nash solution to the bargaining problem is presented. A bargaining game among organized groups with conﬂicting interests offers the means to model the process of accommodation among policy makers and interest groups. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium of a political-economic system with government intervention is identiﬁed with the solution of the corresponding bargaining model. Given the Nash as axioms, it is shown that a unique solution can be derived. A number of alternative “strategic” formulations are reviewed and shown to generate solutions that are equivalent to the results of Nash’s axiomatic speciﬁcation for a two-person, two-stage bargaining problem.
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